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El borde emocional de los depredadores 
financieros: una investigación 
longitudinal con cuatro grupos
Resumen. En los últimos años, los 
inversionistas han sido engañados por sus 
propios expertos financieros. A pesar de las 
advertencias de las organizaciones reguladoras, 
como la Comisión de Seguridad de Valores 
Mobiliarios o los informes publicados por 
periódicos y revistas especializados, muchas 
personas se sienten atrapadas en los esquemas 
de Ponzi. La pregunta es ¿por qué? En este 
trabajo se plantea la hipótesis de que gran 
parte de los inversionistas basó sus decisiones 
en torno a los asesores o agentes financieros 
poco escrupulosos que capitalizaron la 
emoción primitiva. Se realiza una investigación 
longitudinal con cuatro grupos para un periodo 
de seis meses en donde se muestra que la gente 
se involucra en la negociación financiera con 
el corazón, no sólo con sus pensamientos y 
calculadoras.
Palabras clave: depredación percibida, 
modelo Mesly, depredador, presa, afinidad.
Abstract. In the last few years, a number 
of  investors from all walks of  life have been 
duped by their once-trusted financial advisors. 
Despite warnings by regulatory bodies such 
as the Security Exchange Commission or 
educated reports published by newspapers 
and magazines, people still get caught in the 
likes of  Ponzi schemes. The question is why? 
This paper hypothesizes that a large part of  
the blind eye turned onto financial advisors 
and brokers finds its source in primitive 
emotion. A four-group longitudinal study 
spread over six months shows that people 
engage in financial negotiation with their 
hearts and guts, not only with their thoughts 
and calculators.
Key words: perceived predation, Mesly 
model, predator, prey, affinity.
Context
The average investors choose a financial advisor based 
on recommendation, habit (he already deals with a par-
ticular bank that offers financial advice for example), 
or mere reputation. In doing so, they believe they will 
receive timely, accurate, easy-to-understand and com-
plete information. As information is transferred from 
its source (the financial advisor) to its target (the eager 
investor), trust tends to develop. This phenomenon has 
been known for many years. As Deutsch (1958: 274) put 
it: “[…] 80 per cent of  the subjects who received the full 
communication treatment trusted the other person and 
made co-operative choices (e.g. they were ‘trustworthy’ 
as well as ‘trusting’)”.
However, newspapers abound of  stories whereby in-
vestors have been emptied of  their life savings by cold-
tempered individuals. Individuals and companies alike 
are victims of  such fraud: Nick Leeson vs. Barings (the 
oldest British bank that was forced into bankruptcy) in a 
case in point.
People have had plenty of  warnings and read quasi daily 
about financial crooks that build pyramid schemes, create 
false companies, sell valueless shares and print mock docu-
ments. Yet, there isn’t a week without which one reads on 
the amf (Autorité des Marchés Financiers –the regulatory 
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body in the province of  Québec: 7 millions inhabitants) 
site about a new investigation being launched or a new 
charge being laid.
The theory of  financial predation provides a sound 
model for explaining the mechanisms predators and preys 
as they interact over time. Of  particular interest, this theory 
states that people will tend to trust others independent 
of  contractual agreements as a natural social tendency 
(Mesly, 2010).
This paper investigates why people get trapped in financial 
deals that cost them dearly. The first section discusses the 
concept of  financial predation. Next, it addresses the concept 
of  trust and of  its measurement. A reference is made to the 
attachment theory (Bowlby, 1973), and the concept of  Af-
finity is proposed as a proxy for the concept of  attachment. 
The paper continues by outlying the details of  a four-group 
study aimed at discovering more about the reason as to why 
people trust their financial advisor: the basic premise is that a 
financial advisor builds an edge over his customers (perhaps 
unconsciously) by nurturing attachment before or at least 
while appealing to their cognitive capabilities. Results of  the 
study are disclosed with key observations made and com-
mented with respect to previous researches. A discussion 
follows and the conclusion then puts the present research in 
perspective with respect to its limits and possibilities.
1. The concept of financial predation
Predation is the act of  taking advantage of  a negotiating 
party or a vis-à-vis (e.g. a customer or a colleague) for one’s 
own benefit, causing the other harm (e.g. a financial loss), by 
surprise (Mesly, 2012).
Perceived predation is the mechanism by which people 
prepare themselves in case the vis-à-vis turns out to have 
negative intentions (Smith, 1998): it is to the relationship 
customer-financial broker what perceived risk is to the rela-
tionship customer-product. The product might fail just like 
a financial advisor may be erroneous in his evaluation of  the 
financial market or else bluntly dishonest.
Because perceived predation entails the fact that one can 
be abused by another person, and because it involves a sense 
of  harm and danger, it touches on very basic, primal emo-
tions and instinct responses (flight or flee). Hence, using 
perceived predation (how it is measured will be discussed 
further below) seems to be a useful means of  measuring 
deep emotions residing inside the client when facing the 
financial to-be predator: in other words, the more the finan-
cial expert equates with danger, the more negative emotions 
will be expressed by the clients (by the participants in the 
study). The mere strength of  these emotions will help eluci-
date whether clients engage in a relationship with potential 
financial predators on the basis of  emotions rather than as 
calculative, placid investors.
The theory of  financial predation is based on the following 
model (figure 1).
As can be seen, a negative perception of  the financial 
agent (high perceived predation or the fact of  perceiving the 
financial agent as a risk to one’s own financial wealth) will 
have a direct impact on trust. Trust and cooperation work 
hand in hand in a continuous relationship (Larson, 1992; 
Anderson and Narus, 1990; Brooks and Rose, 2008), the 
likes of  a financial advisor and his clients being in touch on 
an on-going basis. A sense of  win-win (equilibrium – An-
derson and Weitz, 1989) serves as a mediating variable, and 
together, trust, cooperation and a sense of  reciprocity should 
eventually create a pleasant interaction between the financial 
advisor and his clients, with present cooperation being the 
main driver of  present atmosphere.
The present paper uses this model of  financial predation 
as a base for its investigation. However, since trust is at the 
heart of  the proposed mechanism whereby naïve investors 
get lured by greedy financiers, our focus should now rest with 
the construct of  trust. 
2. Definition and measurements of trust
There exist countless definitions of  trust, with a one being 
favoured in this paper. Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995: 
712) write: 
“The definition of  trust proposed in this research is the willing-
ness of  a party to be vulnerable to the actions of  another party 
based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular 
action important to the trustor, irrespective of  the ability to 
monitor or control that other party”.
Figure 1.    The original Mesly model of fi nancial predation.
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Several studies (some spanning several decades) have dem-
onstrated that secure individuals tend to stay married longer 
–in other words, attachment is a good predictor of  the length 
of  a relationship (Mikulincer et al., 2002). It has been found 
that couples that display secure emotional commitment, in-
timacy, trust and communication are more accommodating 
and caring than others. 
Accepting that Affinity (as a proxy for attachment) is 
one of  the key variables defining trust could help explain 
why that trust and cooperation persist even in difficult 
times (Wiener and Doescher, 1994).3 Trust shows different 
degrees of  intensity and the following barometer has been 
proposed (Mesly, 2012) (figure 2).
Financial agents will bet on unconditional trust and 
to all they can to instil it: most likely, they will favor at-
tachment by displaying high degrees of  affinities with 
their clientele. Of  peculiar importance to them is to 
avoid entering in the conflict zone, marked by levels of  
relationship tension that ultimately lead to predation: a ) 
frustration (Bobot, 2010); b) provocation, and c) aggres-
sion (Van Goozen et al., 2000). 
As can be seen, this barometer is an indication of  strong 
emotions (e.g. frustration) and was used to develop the 
questionnaire that was distributed to the participants. 
We propose next a working model for trust which will 
serve to test the Mesly model of  financial predation.
This definition has echoes in various other definitions. 
For example, Lewicki, McAllister and Bies use the term 
expectations and add (1998: 39): “In our analysis, we 
define trust in terms of  confident positive expectations 
regarding another’s conduct,1 and distrust in terms of  
confident negative expectations regarding another’s 
conduct.” 
These definitions correlate strongly with the concept of  
perceived predation, as predation is the fact of  taking an 
undue advantage using other people’s vulnerability. In other 
words, when trusting a financial advisor, a client consciously 
(or not) agrees to let his guard down and to become vulner-
able; this of  course could open the doors to actual acts of  
financial predation.
This definition needs to be more succinct in order to 
better analyse the mechanism whereby a financial advisor 
gains an edge over his naïve clients in order to commit his 
financial sins. Bell, et al. (2002) note that trust is defined 
by benevolence, ability (i.e. competence – see also Ravald 
and Grönroos, 1996) and integrity. Nicholson, et al. (2001) 
add that Affinity plays a great role in building trust. They 
define Affinity (or liking) as: “[…] the global attachment 
that the buyer has for the rep” (2001: 5). They find a posi-
tive relationship between Affinity and trust. Doney and 
Cannon had also previously made such link (1997: 40): 
“Empirical studies in business marketing show that feel-
ings of  trust in the salesperson are positively related to 
liking”. Smith (1998: 7) adds a perspective by commenting 
that liking serves to keep a better balance (equilibrium) in 
a business relationship. 
2. 1. Trust and attachment
All in all, it seems four variables can be taken into account 
in order to define trust between a financial agent and his cli-
ent. A strong variable seems to be liking, or put differently, 
Affinity or attachment. The attachment theory was based 
on original work by Bowlby (1973) whereby he looked at the 
bonding between mother and “child” among a population 
of  monkeys. The concept of  attachment is very strongly 
related to trust and rooted deeply into the neurobiological 
functioning of  mammals (at the hypothalamus level, which 
detects danger and regulates key vital functions, in addi-
tion to being involved indirectly in odour detection).2 A 
concept similar to liking is that of  familiarity (although it 
could have a negative connotation depending on context). 
In essence, familiarity refers, in the context of  financial 
investment, to the fact that people will more readily invest 
where they are already acquainted with the companies at 
stake (Wang et al., 2011). 
1. Lewicki et al. (1998) put the text in italic.
2. See Mikulinger and Shaver, 2007.
3. We emphasize that attachment, as discussed here, is to be differentiated from in-
terdependence. The latter would be a pre-condition to establishing a relationship; 
in the present discussion, attachment likely develops as trading parties discover 
affinities. Our narrow definition of attachment and the use of Affinity as a proxy for 
attachment are two of the limits of the present research.
Figure 2.    The barometer of trust.
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3. The model of trust
Four structural variables4 are assumed to be needed to define 
trust in full; hence we propose the following model of  trust 
(figure 3). 
The use of  four variables to measure trust is in line with 
past recommendations. As Anderson and Gerbing (1988: 
414) state: “[…] at least four measures of  a construct are 
needed for an assessment.” 
Our working model will necessarily involve a measure of  
cooperation (as cooperation works hand in hand with trust), 
of  trust (including Affinity as a proxy for attachment) as well 
as perceived predation (as it affects trust through the concept 
of  vulnerability). The working model is completed by taking 
into account the fact that high levels of  trust, cooperation 
and a sense of  win-win should produce a sound, pleasant 
relationship atmosphere between the financial expert and 
his client. As noted previously.
 
Successful behavioural exchanges are accompanied by positive 
moods and emotions, which help to cement the experience of  
trust and set the scene for the continuing exchange and building 
of  greater trust (Jones and George, 1998: 536).
Every element of  the model has now been explained and is 
in place with its respective links to other elements (constructs). 
A study needed to be planned to examine the problem at hand, 
that is, the fact that investors get lured by financial predators.
4. The study
As seen above, we decided to use Affinity as a proxy for attach-
ment, although Affinity is a weaker measure of  attachment. The 
hypothesis is that people are not going to feel any form of  at-
tachment if  they experience some form of  repulsion towards a 
vis-à-vis; hence, a measure of  Affinity is a preliminary measure 
for attachment. Since the goal of  this study is to determine, 
based on the samples available, if  emotions (and in particular 
attachment) play a large part in the dyadic dynamic between 
individuals involved a in business deal, our focus will be on 
looking for the role of  Affinity in the overall mesly financial 
predation model. Our hypothesis, to recall, is as follows:
• H0: Affinity (as a proxy for attachment) plays a leading 
role in the dynamic between negotiating parties.
• H1: Affinity (as a proxy for attachment) does not play 
a leading role in the dynamic between negotiating parties.
In the research that was done, the level of  confidence was 
established at 95% [1 − α (= 0.05)]. Populations and residues 
=> residuals were checked for normality in the regression 
analyses; no excessive co-linearity were found between the 
independent variables (Affinity - AF, Benevolence - BV, 
Ability - HB, and Integrity - IN) and the dependant variable 
(Good negotiating atmosphere - BE). All regressions used 
were found to be significant, with p > 0.05.
The research was conducted as follows. Four groups of  two 
dozen students were brought into a class room between Sep-
tember 2011 and January 2012. Within each group, dyads were 
formed and asked to meet briefly during ten minutes in order 
for each party to get acquainted with the other. The dyads were 
then separated and asked to answer the mesly questionnaire 
(perceived predation) – this will be referred as the before. A 
case for negotiation (in particular financial negotiation) was 
handed to the students: half  received was financial role within 
that case (the pros) and the other half  the opposite position 
(the cons). After spending several hours, the original dyads 
were asked to meet and negotiate an agreement based on their 
opposing views. Each member of  the dyads was then asked to 
answer the slightly modified questionnaire once more – this will 
be referred as the after. Since the students did not leave the 
classroom for a significant amount of  time, it is assume that 
this experiment was close in concept to a laboratory experi-
ment, with most variables under control.
5. The results
The results listed below are only the most significant.5 Of  note, 
gender, level of  education and occupation (some students had 
employment) did not appear to be a factor in the result. The 
4. To relate fully to the concept of structural variables, see the works of Mesly (2010)
and the concepts of formative variables exposed by Jarvis, MacKenzie and Podsa-
koff, (2003). The following conditions are met: a) little if not co-linearity between 
variables; b) changing or retiring one variable would seriously alter the meaning of 
the core concept (Bollen and Lennox, 1991: 308: “Omitting an indicator is omitting 
a part of the construct”).
5. To compare means, independent T-tests were run after checking for normality of 
populations (Kolmogorov-Smirnov KS and Shapiro-Wilk SW tests) and residuals 
(Levene test).
Figure 3.    The working model of trust.
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sample size “n” was 26, 24, 25 and 28 for a total n of  103, 
small but enough to run a sem on the appropriate software.
Because our study was longitudinal across four different 
groups, and in order to simplify the analysis of  the data, we 
will generally proceed in the following order: a ) consider the 
four groups before the negotiation; b) consider the four 
groups after the negotiation; c) compare the four groups 
before and after; d) compare the combined before-after 
groups; e) examine the global end result for the entire set of  
data using structural equation modeling (sem). We proceed 
by listing the most significant observations made through 
data analyses.
By using the approach, we feel confident that our conclu-
sions will be robust as we will examine trends across groups, 
across two points in time (before and after), and across 
various statistical techniques (regressions, factorial analyses 
and sem).
6. Single linear regression analysis: 
Trust => cooperation
The first element we wanted to check was the relationship 
between trust and cooperation, as if  there were no significant 
links, the construct of  cooperation could then be eliminated 
from the working model. We made a number of  observations.
• Observation 1: there is a strong correlation between trust 
and cooperation for the Groups before and the Groups 
after; Groups 2 and 3 display a near perfect cigar-shape form 
around the regression line, proving their statistical quality.
For all intent and purposes, we combined that before and 
after data in order to get a larger sample (see annex table A1).
• Observation 2: there has been a significant improvement 
in the R2 between the before and the after (Group 1: 0.615 
to 0.713: + 19%; Group 3: 0.652 to 0.825: + 27%; Group 4: 
0.549 to 0.796: + 45%) except for Group 2 (0.890 to 0.796: 
−11%). We conclude that the construct of  cooperation must 
be an integral part of  the model, as it most likely influences 
the general dyadic relationship. 
• Observation 3: the correlation coefficient obtained 
in the present study falls very much in line with previous 
studies (Anderson and Narus, 1990 with an estimator at 
0.73; Morgan and Hunt, 1994); Palmatier et al., (2006) did 
a meta-analysis leading them to the conclusion that 90 p. 
100 of  studies confirm the link trust => cooperation (in-
dependent variable). 
• Observation 4: as mentioned, there has been a significant 
improvement in the Pearson coefficient (R2) between before 
and after (except for group 2). Since the before and after 
occurred the same day, a few hours, apart, it is hard to believe 
this adjustment was made cognitively because the negotiating 
parties (the students in their pros and cons roles) had little 
opportunity to analyse each other. Rather, they most likely 
had to relay on the “gut” instinct, that is, on their raw emo-
tions. Hence, the results shown in table A4 seem to indicate 
that indeed emotions play a part in the dyadic exchanges.
7. Factorial analysis (Varimax rotation)
A key measure in psychological analysis is factorial analysis 
(Nunnally, 1970). We proceeded to run factorial analyses using 
Varimax rotation with 25 iterations on the main constructs. 
The construct of  perceived predation was separated in its two 
components: that is, perceived predation is the ratio of  prey 
(one’s sense of  vulnerability) over predator (one’s ability to 
attack). For ease of  reading, predator is always put ahead of  
prey in the theory of  predation; hence, the ratio predator/
prey is an expression of  self-confidence or the opposite of  
the feeling of  being a victim.
• Observation 5: for the groups before and the Groups 
after, there is an inverse relationship between one’s lack 
of  self-confidence (impression of  being a victim; that is, 
perceived predation) and the constructs of  trust, coopera-
tion, equilibrium and positive atmosphere. These results are 
in line with past studies performed on numerous groups 
(Mesly, 2010) and to confirm the law of  perceived preda-
tion: the more one feels he can be victim to a financial prey, 
the less likely he is likely to trust, cooperate, reciprocate and 
participate in a positive relationship. The law is exemplified 
as well when we mix before and after data for the sake of  
argument (see annex table A2).
• Observation 6: perceived predation is a very sensitive 
measure and seems to be an excellent way of  evaluating the 
role of  emotions in the fabrics of  social interactions between 
a financial agent and his customers: two very distinct (com-
ponents) are extracted from the data. Every single time one 
negotiating party feels he is in a position of  power (Pred. 
> Prey), the values of  trust, cooperation, equilibrium and 
atmosphere are positive. As soon as the individual feels he 
is at a disadvantage (more prey than predator: Pred. < Prey), 
the values of  trust, cooperation, equilibrium and atmosphere 
tend necessarily to diminish radically. Even when Pred. = Prey, 
those values near zero. Hence, people are very sensitive to 
the possibility of  danger.
• Observation 7: regardless of  this sensitivity, investors are 
prompt to show unconditional trust towards their financial 
agents. This means –it is our hypothesis, that they act emo-
tionally and not cognitively. Financial bandits will seize this 
opportunity to catch their clients-preys, by surprise.
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8. Multiple linear regression analysis on structural 
variables of trust => atmosphere
So far, all the data collected and analysed has tended to 
prove the validity of  the question asked in this paper. We 
now try determining if  Affinity (the proxy for attachment) 
plays indeed a role in the creation of  trust and of  a positive 
interaction between the financial expert and his client. To do 
this, we resort to multiple regression analyses.
• Observation 8: for the Groups before, Affinity and 
Benevolence (two emotionally-loaded variables) play an 
explanatory role of  the general dyadic atmosphere (be) in 
the majority of  cases.
• Observation 9: for the Groups after and for the Groups 
before-after combined (see annex table A3), Affinity and 
Benevolence (two emotionally-loaded variables) play an ex-
planatory role of  the general dyadic atmosphere (be) in the 
majority of  cases but Ability and Integrity play a role as well.
• Observation 8: the majority of  explanatory variables of  
trust pertain to the emotional spectrum (ability and integrity 
being judged cognitively as they can be somewhat measured: 
ability, for example, can be guessed from the kind of  universi-
ty degree the other has. Emotional variables, like Affinity and 
benevolence, do not imply such capacity of  measurement). 
This strongly suggests that at least during short encounters, 
negotiating parties rely more on their emotional senses than 
on their cognitive appraisal. The sem used below will shed 
more light into this phenomenon.
9. Values of main constructs
We now address the values attributed (measured) to the four 
main constructs (table A4).
• Observation 9: for the groups before, the groups after, 
and the groups before-after, the level attainted by each 
construct suggests a transactional dyad (in the 70%, see 
annex table A4), as opposed to a relational or interpersonal 
one (see Mesly, 2012a). Thus, taking into account previous 
observations, it can be suggested that emotions prevail even 
in short-term transactional dyads.
• Observation 10: there has definitely been a change 
between the before and the after, but this change is most 
noticeable (the only significant change) on the construct of  
cooperation, which is highly correlated with that of  trust. 
The setting of  the study helps explaining such phenomena: 
the participants were involved mostly in cooperative efforts 
over a short period of  time and trust takes a fair bit of  time 
to develop. This finding points to the fact that cooperation 
must be kept in our working model.
10. Perceived predation
We decided to compare the before and after perceived 
predation (PP) (which we know now is a good measure of  
emotions or sensibility) to show the change over time (see 
annex table A6).
• Observation 11: these findings are in line with previous 
findings resulting from multiple group studies performed 
over a number of  years (Mesly, 2010). The acceptable ratio 
for most people in terms of  predator/prey (that is, the mea-
sure of  their perceived capacity to control a situation or the 
reverse of  their perceived predation) is approximately 1.30 
(perceived predation = 1/1.30 = 0.77).
• Observation 12: the spread between the different values 
increases dramatically between the before and the after, 
and the maximum and minimum values moved up. This 
means that during the day of  negotiation, people become 
more flexible, digging more into their willingness to negoti-
ate, and allowing for a wider spectrum of  variations in their 
mood. If  it were not the case and they had remained purely 
cognitive in their approach, they would have maintained the 
same levels of  perceived predation as nothing in the setting 
threatened them, as suggested by the previous findings that 
trust remained quite stable and cooperation improved. This 
is another clue that people use their emotional brain when 
negotiating, but also more of  in as time goes. 
11. Discussion
The previous twelve observations point to the fact that emo-
tions prevail in negotiations (including financial negotiation). 
Emotions are the main resources people resort to in order to 
negotiate with a vis-à-vis, and as time goes, far from becom-
ing less emotional, people expand on their emotional range. 
This could suggest that people develop a sense of  attachment 
(which proxy is Affinity in our study).
It has become increasingly clear that Affinity (as a construct 
structurally formative of  trust) cannot be separated from the 
concept of  cooperation. This may confirm why people who 
tend to work together regularly eventually develop affinities 
even if  from the upstart they seemed to have nothing in 
common.
Given that perceived predation, Affinity, equilibrium, 
cooperation and atmosphere have proven to play a key 
role in our working model; we decided to run a sem test.6 
6. Using Baron and Kenny 1986’s technique, a series of regressions were thereafter 
run proving first that equilibrium is a mediating variable.
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This could not possibly be the case if  the clients were fully 
rational: even if  they didn’t have access to full information, 
being rational they would require full information before 
making decisions that affect their life savings. Rather, they 
expose themselves by accepting to be vulnerable and letting 
themselves emotionally convinced that they are not facing 
a financial predator. In short, a sense of  attachment would 
be what would override cognition and lead investors to fall 
prey to their financial predators.
Our modeling effort using sem shows the following 
(figure 4):11
The indices for the sem are as follows (see annex table A7):
• Observation 13: two of the measures (cfi and ifi, both 
incremental indices) indicate a good fit, but the overall model 
remains to be tested in a larger study.
• Observation 14: all four structural variables of trust 
(af, bv, hb and in) play a role at some point or the other 
(before and after) in the establishment of a sound dyadic 
atmosphere. 
• Observation 15: affinity’s role comes in the after phase. 
This may be due that the dyadic partners were randomly 
chosen during the tests, so that participants did not have the 
luxury of  choosing whom they were going to be paired with. 
However, on the second dyadic meeting (the after session) 
they then had a chance to discover more of  their vis-à-vis.
We had a question on intention to renegotiate in the after 
questionnaire that was submitted to the participants. We 
suspect that there will be an impact first in the variables 
from the before evaluation to the after evaluation, but 
also from atmosphere onto intention to renegotiate in the 
after session. Our hypothesis, to recall, was: H0: Affinity (as 
a proxy for attachment) plays a leading role in the dynamic 
between negotiating parties, with H1 being the opposite. 
If  Affinity does not play a role on the interaction between 
the negotiating parties, then most likely it will not have 
a significant link with perceived predation, cooperation, 
equilibrium and atmosphere. 
To start, we tested our hypothesis with a simple linear 
regression with Affinity => atmosphere (be) for the after 
group:7, 8
AtmosphereAFTER = 3.608 + 0.119* AffinityAFTER + εAFTER  (1) 
 
Affinity has a direct impact on the general atmosphere,9 
but a modest one.10 To recall, Affinity is only a proxy for 
attachment; also, negotiating parties only had a day to get 
to know each other and third, the stakes were minimal and 
somewhat hypothetical. Within this context, finding a mod-
est impact of  Affinity on the atmosphere outcome actually 
speaks volume: it may well be that financial predators can 
create a significant sense of  attachment 
over time, which they could turn to 
their advantage when this would fit 
their egoistic needs. Also, this does 
not mean that Affinity does not have 
a more direct impact on trust as it is a 
key structural variable of  trust.
Finding a model fit using sem would 
lead to us to strongly suggest that 
Affinity, as a proxy for attachment, 
could be an explanatory variable of  
the behaviour of  naïve investors who 
end up, much to their later dismay, 
preys to unscrupulous financial agents. 
The latter, as expert salespeople are 
consciously or unconsciously aware 
of  this tendency towards blind trust 
(unconditional trust) and would capi-
talize on it to serve their own interests, 
catching their client-preys by surprise. 
Through the inherent vulnerability of  
people (a tendency to resort to raw 
emotions), financial bandits build a 
competitive edge to enrich themselves. 
7. Residuals are found to be normal. R2 = 0.366; F = 15.641; p = 0.000.
8. A regression on intention leads to abnormal residuals showing heteroscedasticity, thus this regression is not used.
9. At the established confidence level, there isn’t enough evidence to reject Ho according to which Affinity plays a 
role between negotiating parties. This hypothesis thus appears to likely hold within our research framework.
10. In a previous study, the main author has shown that 25% of the variance in the intention to buy a car was explained 
by two variables: a) the product itself; and b) atmosphere (the relationship with the staff at the dealership).
11. Arrows are drawn using the sem conventions not using standard data percolation methodology (Mesly, 2011).
Figure 4.    The revised working model with SEM.
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• Observation 16: all four structural variables of  trust 
(Affinity, Benevolence, Ability and Integrity) post some 
substantial estimator values, thus indicating their importance 
in the formation of  trust. 
• Observation 17: initial trust (before) is a key influence 
eon current trust (after), whereas past cooperative efforts 
and atmosphere do not exhibit influence past their having 
taken place. In other words, trust, which is highly emotional, 
plays an enduring role in the relationship. Trust is something 
that is built over time and that stays within the individual. 
Since Affinity is a key structural component of  trust, it is fair 
to say that Affinity relates to attachment (since attachment 
evolves over time by definition).
• Observation 18: integrity is the only structural variable 
that appears in the before and after sessions, pinpointing 
its importance in the context of  negotiation. 
• Observation 19: the after relational atmosphere is a 
strong indicator of  intention to negotiate again. In the context 
of  attachment, this means the initial attachment is likely to 
continue if  a pleasant atmosphere prevails.
For the overall before-after model, the likely dyadic sce-
nario can be expressed in the form of  multiple regression 
analysis as follows; after verifying for multicolinearity (VIF) 
and correlations (table of  correlations), the best regression 
that comes out is in the end a single linear regression12 as 
follows (equation 2):13
AtmosphereAFTER = α + + β1 CooperationAFTER 
                              + εAFTER                                                         (2) 
With the following β:14
AtmosphereAFTER = 1.520 + 0.687*CooperationAFTER 
                                       + εAFTER                                                         (3) 
In the context of  our research, cooperation is a key direct 
indicator of  the general relational atmosphere. However, 
analyses presented at the beginning of  this paper have pointed 
to the fact that trust played a fundamental influential role on 
cooperation, and Affinity has been found to be an enduring 
component of  trust.
After running a cluster analysis,15 two classes of  constructs 
seem to have formed by taking into account the construct 
of  Affinity (see annex table A6):
• Observation 20: as can be seen from Table 6, two classes 
form. All numbers in class 2 are higher than class 1, but one 
item stands out: Affinity after. This tends to go in line with 
the sem model showing that Affinity started to be a signifi-
cant defining component of  trust in the 
after session.
We decided to produce a perceptual 
map of  perceived predation, because 
perceived predation and Affinity both 
appear in the after session but fail to 
appear in the before section. The un-
derstanding is that should participant 
feel their vis-à-vis is a predator (overly 
forceful), this would negatively impact 
trust, which is, in the after session, a re-
sult of  Affinity and Integrity (figure A5).
• Observation 21: as can be seen 
from figure 5, almost all participants are 
found in the area under the threshold of  
predation = 1.80. They are also found 
in the most part above the threshold of  
predation >1. So, since the general ne-
gotiating atmosphere has been positive, 
with a value of  atmosphere evaluated at 
a level at 78% (see table A4 in annex), 
it can be said that in the context of  the 
present research, a positive atmosphere 
is set within levels of  1 < predation < 
1.80. Perceived predation is the 1/x ratio 
12. Only linear regressions have been tested. 
13. We also tested the regression model using iterated generalized method of moments/higher moments (iGMM-hm) 
with higher sample moments as instruments (Racicot, 2000;  Racicot and Théoret, 2012) without obtaining better 
results.
14. Adjusted R2: 0.480; F = 93.344, p = 0.000; with residuals judged to be relatively normal.
15. This time, trust was measured as an average of the data collected on its four structural variables.
Figure 5.    Perceptual map of perceived predation.
Legend: Afﬁ n_P = Afﬁ nity AFTER; PE_PO_P = Predator/Prey AFTER. 
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This research points to the fact that Affinity does in fact 
sooner or later play a role in a dyadic relationship where 
monetary transactions are involved. It may be, and this re-
mains to be tested with a larger, more grounded experience, 
that financial predators consciously and unconsciously build 
a form of  attachment from their clientele towards them in 
order to eventually perform their predatory acts, that is, their 
fraudulent activities. The use of  anything that portrays them 
as being of  high integrity (annual reports, recommendations, 
etc.) is a camouflage tactic aimed at emotionally confusing 
their client/preys.
This research indicates that participants express their 
willingness to negotiate further when a reasonably sound 
negotiating atmosphere is set; hence, a sense of  attachment 
would most likely continue to build. This means that as time 
goes, the trust put in the financial advisor would move from 
being random towards conditional. It is thus possible to 
imagine that eventually, unconditional trust would be gener-
ated; this would be the appropriate time for the financial 
predator to attack.
An experienced financial agent would most likely know 
what limits are acceptable or bearable by his clients/preys. 
He would operate within the lower and upper limits found 
in this research, and within the socially accepted scope of  
Affinity (not too much – that is under a threshold of  90%, 
that is, not being too familiar, but surely enough to generate 
interest, at 60% or above, that is, somehow expressing his 
affinities with his clients 60% of  the time, or else, put differ-
ently, approximately once every half  hour.) In other words, 
a typical half  hour conversation between a financial expert 
and his client would contain at least one measure of  Affin-
ity (e.g. discussing things parties have in common) but not 
more as otherwise it would be perceived as overly intrusive. 
An expert predator thus has mastered the art of  generating 
an emotionally-loaded sense of  attachment by showing inter-
est in his client, but not excessively. This zone of  comfort 
would put his client at ease, thus enticing him to lower his 
defence mechanism. 
It cannot be said that Affinity has a leading role in the social 
phenomenon whereby naïve investors end up loosing their 
life savings to unscrupulous financiers. However, it definitely 
plays a role, which we now understand better. It helps creating 
a pleasant, trusting negotiating atmosphere and it encourages 
participants to want to deal with each other in the future. 
of  predation, with acceptable levels of  perceived predation 
set at: min: 0.56, max: 0.99 (just under 1). That is, one can 
live with some level of  perceived predation (which can be 
functional to protect oneself) but the dyadic relationship likely 
becomes dysfunctional past a certain level (0.99). 
• Observation 22: affinity seems acceptable within a range 
of  57% (12/21; assume 60%) on the scale used in the above 
figure 6 and 88% (18.5/21; assume 90%). Being too discon-
nected from the vis-à-vis or too intrusive does not help the 
relationship: it would lead the client to see the financial advi-
sor as being a potential predator. 
To summarize, Affinity has been found to play a key role 
in the formation of  trust, but not a leading role. Rather, the 
construct of  integrity seems to be the key leader amongst 
the four structural variables of  trust (it appears in the 
before and after sessions and exhibit higher estimators 
than Affinity). However, it has also been noted that Af-
finity is an emotional construct that builds over time. We 
would moderate the expression of  our initial hypothesis 
(H0: Affinity, as a proxy for attachment, plays a leading role 
in the dynamic between negotiating parties; H1: Affinity, 
as a proxy for attachment, does not play a leading role in 
the dynamic between negotiating parties), by stating that 
Affinity plays a role, but not a leading role in the dynamic 
between negotiating parties, at least in the context set in 
this research.16 This can nevertheless explain why some 
investors end up being fooled by their financial advisor. 
Once integrity is seemingly acquired, a financial predator 
would want to build some sense of  attachment with his 
future preys in order to gain an unfair advantage. The image 
of  integrity (rendered for example by recommendations, 
annual reports, past performance) would serve as a lure 
to get to hook the customer/prey on a more unconscious 
level, that of  attachment. Since financial products and 
highly intangible and that often substantial amounts of  
money are at stake, it would hard for the client to firmly 
understand the nature and extent of  his relationship with 
the financial advisor.
Conclusion
This research must be considered within its limitations, some 
of  which are the small number of  participants and the fact 
that the setting was not a purely financial one. It has not 
made any attempt to develop a typology of  financial preda-
tors either. Also, we used a proxy (Affinity) for attachment, 
which is a loose measure of  it. We did this because Affinity 
had been proven in previous research to be a sound explana-
tory variable of  trust.
16. At the established confidence level, we feel there is enough evidence to reject Ho 
according to which Affinity plays a leading role in the dynamic between negotiating 
parties. This hypothesis thus appears to be unlikely within our research framework 
which consisted of two negotiating sessions spread over a one working day period.
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In fact, the very fact that naïve investors continue to coop-
erate with their financial advisor leads them towards future 
abuse, when the latter is a potential predator. Additionally, it 
has been seen that the so-called law of  perceived predation 
predicts that when a client feels he is vulnerable (he feels less 
predator than prey, or else predator = prey), he automatically 
reduces his amount of  trust and cooperation with his finan-
cial agent. The latter has thus a keen interest in making his 
customer that he (the customer) has control. We hypothesize 
that this boost to the customer’s sense of  power may actually 
encourage some form of  attachment.
Affinity was used as a proxy for attachment; it can be antici-
pated that a better measure of  attachment would somehow 
bring more light into the predator-prey intricate relationship. 
This paper, if  anything, has pointed to the fact that inves-
tors must be careful not to fall into unconditional trust, and 
that regulatory agencies should become more aware of  the 
fact that financial predators may use emotional tools such 
as attachment in order to lure their victim. Putting a cost on 
such abuse through specific punishment would likely deter 
potential financiers and their acolytes to gear their businesses 
towards fraud and abuse.
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Annex
Table A1.    The combined BEFORE_AFTER groups.                         
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Table A2.    The four COMBINED groups: factorial analysis.                 
* An exception is noticed here. Note that in the bottom part of the table, numbers are pushed to the value of either 1 or 0 to magnify the effects of predators and preys (perceived predation).
Component
Trust
Equilibrium 
Cooperation
Atmosphere
Predator
Prey
Difference Predator-Prey
Trust
Equilibrium 
Cooperation
Atmosphere
Predator
Prey
1
0.909
0.901
0.946
0.988
0.167
−0.613
Pred. > Prey
1
1
1
1
1
0
0.200
0.016
−0.006
0.067
0.914
0.540
Pred. > Prey*
0
0
0
0
1
1
0.945
0.895
0.917
0.758
0.123
−0.111
Pred. > Prey
1
1
1
1
1
0
0.916
0.876
0.874
0.929
0.428
0.017
Pred. > Prey
1
1
1
1
1
0
0.012
−0.040
0.260
−0.428
0.871
0.897
Pred. < Prey
0
0
0
0
1
1
0.256
0.083
0.400
0.084
0.806
0.952
Pred. < Prey
0
0
0
0
1
1
0.902
0.921
0.884
0.802
0.215
−0.112
Pred. > Prey
1
1
1
1
1
0
0.026
0.059
0.269
−0.087
0.821
0.886
Pred. < Prey
0
0
0
0
1
1
1 1 12 2 2 2
ITEM/GROUP
Rounded to 1 or 0
Group 1
Group 1
Group 2
Group 2
Group 3
Group 3
Group 4
Group 4
Table A3.    The COMBINED groups: Multiple linear regression analysis on structural variables.
*a: Variable dépendante : BE_Tot.
Legend: Afﬁ nit = Afﬁ nity (proxy for attachment; Bienv = benevolence; Habilet = abilities (competence); Intég (integrity); BE = interactional atmosphere between the negotiating 
parties. Variable dépendante = explained (dependant) variable. Coefﬁ cients standardises = standardized coefﬁ cients. Modèle = Model.
2.001
0.352
0.474
0.416
0.388
1.238
0.101
0.120
0.130
0.113
1.820
0.182
0.152
0.184
0.141
0.589
0.102
0.158
0.133
0.123
1         (constante)
           AF_Moy
           BV_Moy
           HB_Moy
           IN_Moy
1         (constante)
AF
BV
HB
IN
1         (constante)
AF
BV
HB
IN
1         (constante)
           AFFINIT
           BIENV
           HABILT
           INTE
0.246
0.407
0.073
0.016
0.277
0.455
0.086
0.170
− 0.035
− 0.234
0.611
0.363
0.510
0.188
−0.130
0.133
7.376
0.621
1.048
0.208
0.044
3.596
0.250
0.393
0.058
0.152
6.034
−0.037 
−0.208
0.596
0.314
2.707
0.370
0.190
−0.121
0.112
3.686
1.763
2.212
0.501
0.112
2.906
2.464
3.267
0.447
1.344
3.315
−0.204
−1.364
3.241
2.231
4.599
3.642
1.207
−0.913
0.911
0.001
0.084
0.032
0.619
0.911
0.006
0.018
0.002
0.657
0.186
0.002
0.839
0.180
0.002
0.031
0.000
0.001
0.233
0.366
0.367
Modéle B Erreur standard tBeta Signiﬁ cation
Coefﬁ cients non standardisés Coefﬁ cients standardisés
Group
Regression (all regressions have been found to be signiﬁ cant, to display normal populations and residues
Coefﬁ cientsa*
1
2
3
4
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Table A4.    Average values of main constructs.                 
Legend: n.s. = not signiﬁ cant
Construct                      BEFORE                 AFTER       Difference % 
                                                                                                  (rounded)
Trust
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Atmosphere
72
70
69
79
75
72
78
78
4 (n.s.)
3 (n.s.)
12
−1 (n.s.)
Table A7.    SEM values.                 
Adjustment indices 
(ﬁ t)
GFI
CFI
IFI
PCFI
Key value
>0.9
>0.9
>0.9
The lowest comparative value
Actual values
0.833
0.900
0.902
0.681
Absolute index
Incremental index
Parsimony index
Table  A5.    The four groups BEFORE and AFTER the negotiation: perceived 
predation.                
* The KS and SW statistics show that normality is rejected, so that, technically, we 
cannot perform an independent t-test. If we nevertheless run the t-test, variances are 
assumed equal and the mean difference found to be signiﬁ cant.  
GROUP 1 
Construct (PP) 
Value
Maximum
Minimum
Standard deviation
GROUP 2 
Construct (PP)
Value
Maximum
Minimum
Standard deviation
GROUP 3 (PP) 
Construct
Value
Maximum
Minimum
Standard deviation
GROUP 4 (PP) 
Construct
Value
Maximum
Minimum
Standard deviation
AVERAGE 
Construct (PP)
Value
Maximum
Minimum
Standard deviation
BEFORE
1.27
2.83
0.71
0.52
BEFORE
1.22
2.29
0.86
0.31
BEFORE
1.40
3.40
0.92
0.56
BEFORE
1.24
1.89
0.77
0.30
BEFORE
1.28
2.60
0.82
0.42
1.82
4.00
2.00
0.77
AFTER
1.43
2.78
0.92
0.45
AFTER
1.44
2.00
0.90
0.35
AFTER
1.33
2.45
0.77
0.43
AFTER
1.50
2.81
1.15
0.50
43
41
182
48
Difference % 
(rounded)
17 
21
7
45
Difference % 
(rounded)
3
−40
−2
−38
Difference % 
(rounded)
7 
30
0
43
Difference % 
(rounded)
 17*
8
40
19
AFTER Difference % 
(rounded)
Table A6.    Cluster analysis in the AFTER negotiation.                         
Construct
Afﬁ nity BEFORE
Trust BEFORE
Cooperation BEFORE
Atmosphere BEFORE
Predator/Prey (the
reverse of perceived 
predation) AFTER
Afﬁ nity AFTER
Cooperation AFTER
Atmosphere AFTER
intention
Number of observa-
tions (25 are missing)
13.52
4.50
4.46
4.61
1.41
13.12
4.71
5.04
5.39
41
17.09
5.22
5.03
5.37
1.65
17.61
5.75
5.74
6.54
37
16
16
13
17
17
34
22
14
21
Class
1 2 Difference in %
